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Administrative Recalcitrance and Government
Intervention: Desegregation at the University
of Florida, 1962-1972
by Jessica Clawson
he desegregation of American schools in the wake of the
Supreme Court's 1954 Brown v. Board of Education was often
long, slow, violent, and varied considerably based on location, leadership, and community attitudes .1 The national political
climate also influenced local responses to desegregation, as grass-
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roots conservatism took hold in the post-war era. 2 Although white
segregationists made pledges never to submit to racial integration,
many southern white leaders subtly and strategically accommodated civil rights activists and the federal government. Their compromises helped preserve white elite priorities while casting the
struggle against civil rights activists as part of a national battle to
preserve the fundamental quality of American freedom .s
Segregationist leaders who employed this contingency called their
strategy "practical segregation," as distinct from the hard-line plans
of the White Citizens' Council. 4 These more moderate segregationists sought to balance state-sponsored segregation with other
concerns for industrial and political development. Believing that
direct defiance would not work, they attempted to take control of
the pace, timing, and location of desegregation. Proponents advocated measured, peaceful tactics, to keep desegregation from the
public eye and minimize outside interference. In Florida, for
example, Governor Leroy Collins held this view at the time of
Brown v. Board decision by the U.S. Supreme Court. 5 Likewise, university presidents across the nation, including those who guided
the University of Florida, adopted this strategy.
Historians of southern desegregation have focused on the values, motives, and actions of white segregationists, while historians
of education have discussed the dynamics of university desegregation and made crucial contributions to understanding black
agency, policy, and student activism. Neither group has focused on
2.
3.
4.

5.

Carter, The Politics of Rage, 11 0; and Matthew Lassiter. Silent Majority: Suburban
Politics in the Sunbelt South (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006), 2.
Crespino, In Search of Another Country, 4.
Crespino, 19. The White Citizens' Council was a white supremacist organization formed in 1954. Its goals were to oppose racial integration and protect "European-American heritage." Eventually the group had branches all
across the South, and around 60,000 members. The groups usually had the
support of many local business and civic organizations, and unlike the Ku
Klux Klan, were not a secret organization. Like the Klan, however, WCC
members were often responsible for the loss ofjobs and homes of black and
white people who supported black civil rights. The group changed its name
to the Conservative Citizens Council in 1988, and continues to use that
name today.
Jerrell H. Shofner, "Custom, Law, and History: The Enduring Influence of
Florida's 'Black Code,"' History of Education Quarterly 55, no.3 (1977): 277-98;
Joseph A. Tomberlin, "Florida Whites and the Brown Decision of 1954,"
History of Education Quarterly 51, no. 2 (1972): 22-36; and Thomas R. Wagy,
"Governor Leroy Collins of Florida and the Selma Crisis of 1965," History of
Education Quarterly 57, no. 4 (1979): 403-20.
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the role of segregationist university presidents. 6 Throughout the
mid- to late-1960s, university presidents across the United States
responded to student activism in a wide range of ways that set the
course for their own institutions' desegregation. 7 Examining the
desegregation of Florida's flagship university can help historians
look beyond the headline-making moments of integration in "the
Deep South." 8 The University of Florida, located in Gainesville,
Florida, had its share of student activism, and administrators had
to chart a careful course balancing outsider demands with student
pressure. Two University of Florida presidents-]. Wayne Reitz and
Stephen C. O'Connell-employed the practical segregationist
strategies of other postwar and mid-century conservative leaders
and thereby slowed the integration of the university. This case history presents an example of how practical segregationist strategies
worked in the 1960s and early 1970s, before federal mandates put
an end to presidential recalcitrance. It examines the roles played
by the two presidents of the University of Florida in the unfolding
of desegregation and places their views on race and education
6.

7.
8.

Wallenstein, "Brown v. Board of Education and Segregated Universities;"
Wallenstein , "Segregation, Desegregation, and Higher Education in
Virginia." Donald Boyd's paper on Stephen C. O'Connell discusses
O'Connell's response to student activism on campus; the paper is contextualized in student dissent, rather than in university desegregation or conservative ascendancy nationwide . Donald Boyd, "The Irony of Protest" (paper
presented at the History of Education Society Annual Conference, October
2005). Also, William Link's biography of William Friday, the president of the
University of North Carolina during desegregation, looks in depth at the role
of the university president during such a turbulent time, but I would not categorize Friday as a segregationist in the vein of Reitz and O'Connell (Link,
William Friday, 82-98) .
Link, 82-98.
Robert 0. Self argues that historians should not only focus on the South as
the postwar location of black activism and the civil rights movement; by extension, historians need to continue to look beyond the states known for their
violence in response to the 1960s civil rights movement. See American Babylon:
Race and the Struggle for Postwar Oakland (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 2005), 235. Further, Paul Ortiz makes the case for studying Florida,
demonstrating that Florida was the site of a great deal of violence in the earlyand mid-20th century. Ortiz puts th e Florida civil rights movement in the context of the national post-World War I black freedom struggle. The Florida
struggle was distinctive because Floridians built a statewide social movement
linking rural and urban residents. Black Floridians continuously resisted segregation but their effectiveness varied with regional and national economic,
political, and legal change. See Emancipation Betrayed: The Hidden History of
Black Organizing and White Violence in Florida from Reconstruction to the Bloody
Election of 1920 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), 61-63.
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within the context of state and national conservative ideologies,
particularly those related to anticommunism and segregation.
Presidents Reitz and O'Connell were both "practical segregationists" who understood the likelihood of desegregation, but
sought to control it. They relied on tokenism, empty promises, and
slow movement to stall the integration of the University of
Florida's student body and faculty. Both men endorsed the national conservative ideology of the mid-twentieth century, especially
anticommunism and a commitment to segregation. AB leaders of
the university and important figures in the Gainesville community,
each worked toward preserving the tradition of segregation-in
spirit, if not in absolutes. They guided the state's largest university
through a key transitional period of state and national racial
change, thus shaping the demographics of the university in lasting
ways. Both men employed the rhetoric of white backlash and distrust in the federal government to stall the speed of integration
and de-emphasize the student protests on campus during the
Vietnam War. O'Connell in particular was known for exhibiting no
tolerance for outspoken liberal students, and when some students-black and white-protested his recalcitrance on racial
issues, he was unwilling to cede any ground. Mter Vietnam War
protests on campus, the national media began to cover events at
the University of Florida, and the federal government pressured
O'Connell to increase black student enrollment, or risk losing federal funding. 9 University presidents had an important role to play
in a time of great upheaval, and while much of the research has
focused on the dynamic and powerful student stories, understanding the administrations' roles in the proceedings provides a fuller
picture of the course of desegregation, and its aftermath.
Conservatism and the South

The roots of conservatism in the postwar United States had
both top-down and bottom-up elements. Conservatism is a difficult
term to define, but this essay will focus on the strands related to
anticommunism and segregationist principles. These are the
aspects of conservatism that most motivated Reitz and O'Connell.
9.

Lester Hale, interview by Samuel Proctor, 22 May 1982, Proctor Oral History
Program, University of Florida, Gainesville, FL, 51; Stephen C. O'Connell,
interview by Samuel Proctor, 13 September 1991, Proctor Oral History
Program, University of Florida, Gainesville, FL, 142-45.
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Grassroots conservatism was fundamental to the overwhelming
success of the conservative movement in cementing its ideologies
in national politics, moving the United States to the center-right of
the political spectrum in a period of great upheaval. For many
Americans, the Republican Party was no longer the party of
wealthy interests and big business, but the party ofthe average family. The Democratic Party, in their eyes, consisted of elitists who triumphed social engineering, privilege, and special interests at their
personal expense. This populist makeover transformed American
politics. 10 Segregationists used what they saw as undue government interference to frame their fight as a national struggle
against coercive centralized government.U
At the grassroots level, many white southerners saw the civil
rights movement as a communist conspiracy. They thought the
actions of blacks were so novel and unthinkable that they must have
been the work of outside influences, like the Communist Party.
White segregationists developed a circular worldview defined by
local black people, outside agitators, and civil rights. Believing the
civil rights movement was a communist conspiracy allowed these segregationists to more easily justify their opposition to it. The enemy
was not "their Negroes," but a faceless red monolith, and whites
could see themselves as defenders of American freedom. It was hard
to understand how the blacks they had always seen as docile and easily manipulated could have become so suddenly organized, discontented, and autonomous in the 1960s. Anticommunism provided a
crutch. 12 In the face of this disorienting discontent on the part of
southern blacks, some whites fled to the suburbs and the New
Republican Party, which, by the late 1960s, used racial innuendo to
play on fears of black advances. Middle and upper class whites had
disliked the actions of the white lower class, whom they perceived to
engage in mob-like behavior, but now feared integration and the tax
burden for new social services imposed by the activist federal government.l 3 These changes to the outlook and daily lives of conservative
constituents occurred nationwide. In Florida, the state saw demographic and social changes of its own during this time that led to the
rise of the Republican Party.
10.
11.
12.
13.

Donald T. Critchlow, Phyllis Schlajly and Grassroots Conservatism (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 2005), 214.
Crespino, In Search of Another Country, 92.
Sokol, There Goes My Everything, 83-93.
Ibid., 114.
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Florida's Political History
Florida moved from its position as a backwater southern state
to a crucial locus for the nation's politics and prosperity during the
era of conservatism's rise. 14 The civil rights movement and massive
resistance splintered the state Democratic Party and allowed the
Republican Party to emerge. The election of Democrat Leroy
Collins to the governorship in 1955 provided Florida leadership for
modernizing race relations at a time when many other southern
governors had not even considered integration. Collins was something of a practical desegregationist. He encountered extremists at
every stage, but refused to allow Florida to fall into a racial quagmire. He eventually came to believe and publicly state that changing southern racial customs was a moral obligation. Collins also
supported student activists, at political cost to himself. 15
All of this said, the long-held assumption that Florida has
always been more progressive than other southern states in terms
of race relations is unjustified. Florida's history shares the "economic predation, political exclusion, spiritual oppression, and
endemic violence" with its Deep South neighbors. 16 Segregation
was ingrained in the psyche of Floridians, and their electoral
behavior indicates their sense of injustice at being compelled to
integrate. The 1885 Florida State Constitution enshrined two
aspects of segregation into the fabric of the state: Article XII,
Section 12 stated that "White and colored children shall not be
taught in the same school, but impartial provision shall be made
for both." 17 Article XVI, Section 24, also prohibited social interaction between white and black people: "All marriages between a
white person and a negro, or between a white person and a person
of negro descent to the fourth generation, inclusive, are hereby
forever prohibited." 18
As of the spring of 1954, Florida was one of four states with no
school integration at all. Thus, the Brown v. Board decision was significant to the state's public education tradition . White resistance
14.
15.
16.

17.
18.

David R. Colburn, From Yellow Dog Democrats to Red State Republicans: Florida and
its Politics since 1940 (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2007), 2.
Colburn, 16; and Wagy, "Governor Leroy Collins of Florida," 403-20.
Irvin D. S. Winsboro, introduction to Irvin D.S. Winsboro, ed., Old South, New
South, or Down South ?:Florida and the Modern Civil Rights Movement
(Morgantown: West Virginia Un iversity Press, 2009), 1-2.
Florida Constitution of 1885, art. XII, sec. 12.
Ibid. art. XVI, sec. 24.
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to Brown occurred almost immediately. Acting governor Charlie
Johns stonewalled desegregation and his actions filtered down to
other state officials, local lawmakers, and school board members
statewide. 19 State School Superintendent Thomas Bailey echoed
the thoughts of most white Floridians when he said, in explaining
why the state would go on with school construction as planned, that
"My presumption is that Negroes attending a good school are going
to prefer to remain there." By 1956, Florida had abandoned its
moderate position on Brown, as had the South generally. The White
Citizens Council movement spread throughout the South, including Florida, in a show of hostility to the Court's second Brown decision in 1954. Collins offered financial incentives to school boards to
desegregate, but when he left office only Dade County had desegregated-and its desegregation involved four black students attending one elementary school. Under Governor Cecil Farris Bryant in
1961, Florida took a more dogmatic stance against desegregation .20
Following the 1964 Civil Rights Act, many Democrats switched to
the Republican Party due to their outrage and feelings of betrayal.
Others voted Republican because they worried that race-based policies might harm their opportunities, and did not support the idea of
court-mandated public schools in the state. These fears mirrored the
feelings of newly-minted Republicans nationwide, who saw urban
chaos and voted for the candidate who promised law and order. The
Republican electoral majority in Florida and across the United States
emerged with the 1968 election of Richard Nixon, who won among
middle-class voters everywhere. 21 Florida went through the same
upheaval as the rest of the nation. The demographics in Florida were
different than in other southern states, given that it had a large population of Midwestern and Northeastern transplants, but it retained
the Deep South's commitment to racial exclusion.
The University of Florida underwent massive changes in the first
half of the 20th century as well. Opened in 1906 to serve white male
students, it grew to be one of the largest public universities in the
nation during the 20th century. World War II impeded the growth of
the university until the Federal Servicemen's Readjustment Act of
1944 prompted unprecedented funds for campus construction to

19.
20.
21.

Winsboro, Old South, New South, or Down South?, 11.
David R. Colburn, Racial Change and Community Crisis: St. Augustine, Florida,
1877-1980 (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1991), 25-27.
Colburn, From Yellow Dog Democrats to Red State Republicans, 98.
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keep pace with the rapidly rising enrollment. Over the next decade,
the campus grew, thanks in part to the admission ofwomen in 1947.
Subject to national and international events such as wars and the feminist movement, the university experienced the pains of growth and
adjustment in an unstable time. When]. Wayne Reitz became president of the university in 1954, he saw the importance of the university to world events. Presidents before him had "stressed the university's
international role as a cosmopolitan institution abetting goodwill and
world peace," but Reitz "defined the university's global role as an
agent against communism." 22 He adopted the Cold War ideologies of
the national conservative movement, hoping to inspire the university's
foreign graduates to become ambassadors for the United States and
cultivate new allies overseas. Integration was not among his priorities
until he, along with the state administration and the Board of
Governors, made the decision to quietly allow seven black students to
enroll in the undergraduate division of the university in 1962.

J. Wayne Reitz and Initial Desegregation
For a person who would be thrust into the early struggles of
desegregation,]. Wayne Reitz had very little background in politics
before becoming the University of Florida's fifth president. He was
born in Kansas and never lived south of Urbana, Illinois, before he
moved to Florida in the 1930s. He worked for the Farm Credit
Administration before becoming a professor of agricultural economics at the University of Florida. Reportedly, he made his career choice
when stuck in a snowstorm in Colorado, where he was traveling for
work. He had time to contemplate his life goals, and concluded that
he eventually wanted to go into education, thinking he could make a
difference. 23 In 1949, Reitz was appointed Provost for Agriculture.
He became the fifth president of the university on April1, 1955. 24
As president, Reitz faced controversy from all sides, while also
working to maintain cultural customs of the university. He supported
strict behavior and dress codes for women, continued in the spirit of
22. Sevan G. Terzian and Leigh Ann Osborne , "Postwar Era Precedents and the
Ambivalent Quest for International Students at the U nive rsity of Florida,"
Journal of Studies in International Education 10, no. 3 (2006) : 297.
23. Frances Reitz, interview by Emily Ring, 21 March 1986, Proctor Oral History
Program , Unive rsity of Florida, Gainesville, FL, 10-11.
24. University of Florida Office of the President Website, Biography of]. Wayne
Reitz. http:/ / www.president.ufl. edu/ pastPres/ reitz.htm (accessed January
12, 2011).
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1957. Image courtesy of University of Florida Digital

Collection.

President Albert A. Murphree's efforts to ban alcohol consumption
and other immoral behaviors, and installed a Faculty Disciplinary
Committee. Many students and faculty saw these moves as too controlling of student conduct, particularly women's behavior. Reitz also continued the University of Florida's tradition of promoting
anticommunism. 25 Under his watch, the Florida Legislative
25.

During the Red Scare of 1919, Dr. Newell L. Sims, a sociology and political
science professor at the University of Florida, made "suspicious statements"
referring to the "hellish American government" and praised the Soviet system. Federal agents raided his office and his home, but failed to find any
incriminating evidence. The university administration was embarrassed by the
national attention given to his case, and was relieved when Sims resigned
under pressure. President Murphree, in a letter to a friend, said that "the
whole matter was deplorable. We are going to have no socialism, Bolshevism,
or atheism at the university." See Julian Pleasants, Gator Tales: An Oral History
of the University of Florida (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2006), 20.
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Investigating Committee, otherwise known as the Johns Committee,
accused and fired twenty-two employees, and expelled several students, for homosexuality in the early 1960s. For nine years, the Johns
Committee, ostensibly rooting out communism in the dying light of
the McCarthy hearings, targeted anyone who was a "free and liberal
thinker without concern for society" on the university campus and
elsewhere in the state. Reitz cooperated with the committee and was
involved in its targeting of homosexuals on the university campus.
Later, Reitz laid responsibility on the state, claiming that administrators had no alternative but to counsel the accused to leave the university.26 Reitz embraced the postwar conservative idea that the civil
rights movement and other non-mainstream views were likely to be
communist-influenced, if not communist conspiracies. 27
Another scandal struck at the end of the Reitz presidency. In
1967, university officials denied tenure to MarshallJones, a professor
of psychiatry and psychology in the university's College of Medicine.
Jones had been arrested twice in previous years for picketing at civil
rights demonstrations in Florida. His activism aside, he was enormously popular with his students and with his department. He had been
unanimously recommended for tenure by his deans and superiors in
the College of Medicine, and was up for promotion in addition to
tenure-a sign of respect from his department heads. O:fficially,Jones
was fired for giving a speech entitled "The Role of Faculty in Student
Rebellion" to the educational honor society, a speech that was later
published in a scholarly journal. A professor who knew both Reitz and
Jones well said Reitz called Jones "an evil man" who needed to be
removed. Students and faculty spoke out and protested the reasons
for Jones's firing. The American Academy of University Professors
censured Reitz for denying Jones tenure based on such flimsy reasoning. Jones's counsel maintained that he had been denied tenure
because "President Reitz didn't like his political beliefs," including a
policy of rebellion and social change. 28
The St. Petersburg Times also spoke out in support ofJones:
His ability to teach his students was acknowledged in the recommendation for a promotion. He was not accused of insert26.
27.
28.

Graves, And They Were Wonderful Teachers; and Pleasants, Gator Tales, 50.
Crespino, In Search of Another Country, 83-93.
Robert Ben Cason, "Cause for Controversy in Gainesville," St. Petersburg Times,
11 November 1967; and Eunice Martin , "Committee Deliberates Marshall
Jones Case," St. Petersburg Times, 8 May 1968.
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ing political opinions in his lectures, nor of creating intolerable campus dissension, nor of insubordination. Instead, a
speech on student rebellion which he delivered to a professional organization and which was reprinted in a scholarly
journal, was given as cause. This has the shabby mark of
someone looking for a reason to fire him. We also disagree
with Jones' opinions, but defend his right to speak them.29
Various communities took Jones's denial of tenure very seriously.
Jones had been mistreated because he encouraged an activist mindset
among his students. Reitz had already demonstrated during the Johns
Committee witch-hunt that he was willing to persecute his own faculty members in service of the state's anticommunist goals. While there
is no evidence that Jones was a communist or a conspirator, he supported activist students. In support of postwar anticommunism,
whether consciously or not, Reitz had Jones fired. These actions help
explain the tone of Reitz's presidency during a time when some
Americans feared communist infiltration on college campuses.
Others defended the actions of Reitz. In an oral history interview
two decades after Reitz's tenure ended, Vice President of Student
Affairs Lester Hale remembered, "Wayne Reitz brought a very deep
sense of ethical responsibility and a new type of administrative style
that the university was in need of at the time." 30 Hale was fiercely
loyal to Reitz. They both represented the power structure of the university, and Hale would embrace the practical segregationist strategies and rhetoric of Reitz and his successor. Stephan Mickle, among
the first group of black students admitted to the university, noted that
Reitz alone did not determine the moment of desegregation. Rather,
Ferris Bryant (governor ofFlorida from 1961-1965) had told Reitz, in
Mickle's words, "We do not need the kind of dogs, lying, and foolishness that is going on in Mississippi. We have a tourist state and a citrus industry. We do not want to do anything that is going to harm our
industry, so you let them little, southern, colored children in there
and keep them quiet." No civil rights movement in Gainesville existed at the time, and the Gainesville newspaper did not mention the
school's desegregation, because, according to Mickle, "They [the
governor and Reitz] did not want the rednecks to come in and start
trouble. So the University of Florida very quietly integrated." 31
29.
30.
31.

Editorial, "Marshall jones' Tenure," St. Petersburg Times, 11 December 1967.
Hale , interview, 52; and Pleasants, Gator Tales, 44.
Stephan P. Mickle, interview by Joel Buchanan, 3 October 1995, Proctor Oral
History Program, University of Florida, Gainesville, FL, 22.
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Indeed, it appears that Bryant was no crusader for civil rights.
However, he had decidedly refused to "stand in the schoolhouse
door" alongside other southern governors when asked to take a
leadership role in resisting integration. Mter Brown v. Board of
Education, Bryant neither blocked integration nor encouraged it,
but he did oppose the idea of mandatory integration imposed by
the federal government, believing the best solution to these problems could only come from voluntary action on the part of citizens.
He also believed Florida had been a consistently conservative state
since the mid-1940s, and wanted to govern in a way that would
most please the greatest possible number of constituents.32
Reitz, freed from having his hand forced in either direction by
the governor, proved to be a practical segregationist during his
time in office. He thought it best to desegregate on a token basis
before the school was sued for admission to the undergraduate
division . He admitted a handful of black students to p lacate the
civil rights community without fundamentally changing the lives of
white students on campus. Neither the federal government nor the
civil rights community intervened. Without national attention and
federal intervention, black student enrollment would remain low,
fewer than seventy students at most, for the next eight years. 33
The initial desegregation of the University of Florida proceeded smoothly. In the fall of 1962 seven black undergraduates registered-Johneya Williams, Alice Marie Davis, Rose Greene, Jesse
Dean,John Redic, Oliver Gordon, and Stephan Mickle. Their registration received some attention from opponents of desegregation but no violent opposition. 34 The accommodating white
student population, the willingness of the Gainesville press to
avoid publicizing the event, and the support of the governor
32.

Ferris Bryant, interview by Ray Washington, March 1979, Proctor Oral History
Program, University of Florida, FL, Gainesville.
33. The University of Florida was sued to admit students to the law school, and
the law school had been desegregated in 1958. This desegregation process
had also proceeded without violence of any sort. Richard Alexander's nonthesis Master's paper discusses this process, focusing on the student perspective. The date of his paper is not available. A copy of the paper is available in
the University of Florida Special Collections. See Richard Alexander, "'A
Smooth Transition': Racial Integration at the University of Florida, 19541958" (Non-thesis Masters . University of Florida, date unavailable).
34. Peter Wallenstein, "Black Southerners in Nonblack Universities: The Process of
Desegregating Southern Higher Education, 1935-1965," in Higher Education and
the Civil Rights Movement: l'Wlite Supremacy, Black Southerners, and College Campuses,
ed. Peter Wallenstein (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2008), 43-44.
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helped quash potential violence. 35 This lack of attention may have
made life immediately easier for the students, but ultimately, it was
to their detriment, as they were unable to fully integrate into the
university. The practical segregationist strategy Reitz employed
worked, and meant that state conservatives could downplay the
effectiveness of and attention to the civil rights movement.
The national climate was useful to Reitz. John F. Kennedy campaigned on a promise to rid the nation of de jure racial discrimination. However, for much of his presidency, he remained silent on
civil rights. He did not want to risk potential foreign policy consensus amongst Americans by alienating valuable constituents. On matters of civil rights, the Kennedy administration preferred to use
persuasion rather than coercion. 36 With this kind of permissiveness
from the president of the nation, the president of the university
found it much easier to desegregate on a token basis. A baseline level
of compliance and accommodation was enough to keep the negative
attention of the Kennedy administration away from Florida. 37
Given the desire of Reitz and Bryant to avoid federal intervention, it is worth noting that the very peacefulness of the initial integration did not escape national attention. In 1963, Reitz received a
memo from the Kennedy White House asking him for the details of
the integration, saying it was "one of the best desegregation jobs in
the country."38 Reitz credited the willingness of the students to privilege the school's reputation over their opinion of integration, a cooperative governing board, and the fact that no one outside the school
or the state tried to use the integration process for political capital. 39
Undercutting the ability of civil rights workers to use the desegregation of the university to strengthen their movement was precisely the
goal of Reitz and of southern conservative leaders at the time.
35.

36.
37.
38.
39.

The president of the student body, Bill Trickel, said in an interview on 7
September 1962 with the Florida Alligator, "As president of the student body,
I feel that I can speak for the great majority of the students here and say that
the recent integration at the undergraduate level will be received with the
same maturity as integration of our graduate level in past years" (Lawrence,
"Integration Arrives Without Incident"). It is also worth noting that the black
students were not accompanied by armed National Guardsmen, as black students desegregating other southern universities had been.
Chafe, The Unfinished journey, 206-09.
Crespino, In Search of Another Country, 76, 176; and Link, William Friday, 252.
Brooke Haye to]. Wayne Reitz, 6 July 1963.]. Wayne Reitz Papers, University
of Florida Library, Gainesville, FL.
]. Wayne Reitz to Brooke Haye, 17 July 1963.]. Wayne Reitz Papers, University
of Florida Library.
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Reitz handled desegregation in a way entirely consistent with the
strategies of the anticommunists and segregationists within the rising
conservative movement. By the early 1960s, this became an increasingly common strategy for those who wanted to slow the loss of their
old way oflife, and similar tactics were used at universities in Georgia,
Virginia, Texas, and South Carolina. At other universities in the
South, school presidents attempted to accommodate proponents of
desegregation while appeasing those who resisted change-even as
they themselves might have resisted it personally. Desegregation at
these universities was not always smooth, but the tactics were familiar
by the time the University of Florida used them.40 Retiz was effective
because he was able to keep the student body on board, preventing
outbursts, and assuring them, if only between the lines, that this
would not change their way of life. For the most part, black students
lived off campus, were rarely called on in class, and did not interact
with the white students. 41 According to Mickle, "It was mainly a wall
of silence. Nobody spoke to you all day long." The university made no
effort to integrate the students into campus life in the early years of
desegregation. 42 Reitz and Bryant had done what they needed to do
to prevent the introduction of fire hoses and dogs. Reitz resigned the
presidency in 1967, citing fatigue. 43
Stephen C. O'Connell

O'Connell's personal history was more political, as well as more
southern, than was Reitz's. He was a native Floridian, having been
born in West Palm Beach, and received his undergraduate and law
degrees from the University of Florida. He served in World War II and
then worked as a lawyer while becoming active in the Democratic
Party. He was appointed to the Florida Supreme Court by Governor
LeRoy Collins in 1955 and was elected chiefjustice in 1967. That same
year, he resigned the bench to become the sixth president of the
University of Florida and the first alumnus to do so. 44
40.
41.
42.

43.
44.

Crespino, In Search of Another Country, 109; Sokol, There Goes My Everything, 97;
and Wallenstein, Higher Education and the Civil Rights Movement.
Wallenstein, "Black Southerners at Nonblack Universities," 43-44.
Mickle, interview, 23. For examples of the problems of integration and sports,
see Derrick E. White, "From Desegregation to Integration: Race, Football,
and 'Dixie ' at University of Florida," Florida Historical Quarterly, 88, no.4
(Spring 2010): 469-496.
University of Florida Office of the President Website, Biography of]. Wayne Reitz.
http:/ /www.president.ufl.edu/pastPres/reitz.htm (accessed january 12, 2011).
Pleasants, Gator Tales, 55; and Boyd, "The Irony of Protest."
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Stephen C. O'Connell standing in front of Tigert Hall , 1960s. Image courtesy of
University of Florida Digital Collections.

In 1955, The Florida Supreme Court heard Virgil Hawkins v.
Board of Control, in which Hawkins, an Mrican American, sued to
be admitted to the University of Florida law school. He had been
attempting to enter the law school since 1949, and the courts had
refused to admit him based on the separate but equal doctrine of
Plessy v. Ferguson. The United States Supreme Court ordered the
Florida Supreme Court to reconsider after Brown v. Board. The
Florida Supreme Court's opinion decried the federal government's interference in states' rights and proclaimed that Hawkins
should not be denied admission because of his race, but because
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to do so would "cause a public mischief." O'Connell and the other
members of the court felt that Hawkins was not trying to get an
education, but to prove something, and that the well-being of the
university should not be jeopardized to serve that particular purpose. O'Connell also argued that Hawkins was not qualified for
admission. 45
As president, O'Connell, like Reitz before him, faced anumber of controversies. His presidency coincided with the height of
student protests over the Vietnam War and civil rights issues.
During his tenure, he saw not only the student demonstration that
is discussed in this paper, but also political struggles with the campus newspaper, the Alligator, student protests against the war, and
faculty unrest. 46
O'Connell was a self-identified conservative. He has been
described as the second-most conservative justice on the court.
O'Connell's conservatism, he said, meant not "keeping the same
order of things forever," but "respect for authority; respect for the
law once it is tested and found to be good; and respect for other
people's rights" as well as the opportunity to behave freely "so long
as it does not harm anyone else." 47 He concurred with Bryant, and
many others, in his belief that the United States Supreme Court
overstepped its bounds in the Brown v. Board case. Admitting that
the legislative bodies were doing nothing to advance the cause of
civil rights, and that the actions of the Court did improve the lives
for many people, O'Connell maintained his belief that the Court
acted wrongly in legislating. 48
Increases in Enrollment and Unrest

In 1968, the university's black student population increased
slightly. Sixty-one black students enrolled in the1967-68 school
year. The next school year the number increased by roughly two
thirds, to 103 out of the total student body of roughly 22,000. 49
45. Wallenstein, "Segregation, Desegregation, and Higher Education in
Virginia." For more on Virgil Hawkins, see Larry 0. Rivers, "'Leaning on the
Everlasting Arms': Virgil Darnell Hawkins's Early Life and Entry into the Civil
Rights Struggle," Florida Historical Quarterly, 86, no. 3 (Winter 2008): 279-308.
46. Pleasants, Gator Tales, 55; and Boyd, "The Irony of Protest."
47. O'Connell, interview, 92.
48. Ibid., 94.
49. Memorandum, "Prepared Answers to Interview," 18 August 1969, Stephen C.
O'Connell Papers, University of Florida Library, Gainesville, FL.
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This was the first year a full-time black faculty member was
employed at the university, 50 and was also an important year for
the integration of sports teams, following the threat of a
Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) investigation of the school's integration efforts.51 At the beginning of the
1969-1970 school year, black student enrollment was up to 156, a
fifty percent increase from the previous year. The population
remained a tiny fraction of the entire student body of over 20,000,
but steadily climbed. The black student population more than
doubled in the fall of 1970, to 350, and 548 black students registered for classes the following fall. 52
As the black student enrollment grew, so did the tension
between the student body and the administration. Black students
and many white students felt they did not have O'Connell's attention, and that he was less concerned for their welfare than he
should have been. The students wrote letters to him asking for
more attention to black students' needs, such as establishing a center for black culture. The school could no longer escape national
attention as its black student population, while increasing, was still
very low. Federal authorities from HEW and the Civil Rights
Commission noticed the lack of black athletes. O'Connell felt pressure from within and without the school's brick walls. Here was a
segregationist president who was increasingly at odds with his student body. Across the nation, universities saw their students move
leftward and speak out, and the conservative rhetoric that forged a
political base among non-college constituents failed to soothe these
activists. 53 As a state politician, O'Connell's conservative rhetoric of
slow change may have been effective. As a university president, the
words rang hollow in the ears of the students of all races whose
activism- be it pro-integration, anti-war, or in favor of women's
rights or gay liberation-increasingly reflected their ideology.
50.
51.

52.

53.

O'Connell, interview, 147.
Memoranda to Coach Ray Graves from Head Coaches Jack Westbrook, B.E.
Bishop, William E. Harlan, and Potter [no first name given], 5 June 1968.
Stephen C. O'Connell Papers, University of Florida Library, Gainesville, FL.
Memorandum, "Prepared Answers to Interview." Some of this growth must, of
course, be attributed to the number of newly recruited black athletes
enrolled, and perhaps the recruitment searches themselves prompted some
black students to apply. Those black students who had the grades to be admitted to the University of Florida but who did not demonstrate athletic skill
great enough to participate in a sport may have been made aware of the possibility of attending the University.
Anderson, The Movement and the Sixties, 166; and Link, William Friday, 128.
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Approaching the Tipping Point
From the beginning of O'Connell's presidency, students and
faculty questioned him about the low numbers of black students.
He believed that the programs implemented in 1968 and 1969
adequately addressed the issue, and that the school was an educational institution and not the place to prove a point. He wanted
the university to "create an environment and cause to exist an environment where all kinds of views and positions could be heard and
that the university should not align itself with any of those positions. If it did, instead of becoming an arbitrator or being in a position of hearing and allowing all to be heard, it was taking a
position against that." 54 Taking a position of neutrality in this case,
in which the equitable treatment of students and citizens asking
for more representation and better treatment is the cause for
which students were loudly declaring their stance, is, in fact, to side
with the state. To remain neutral is to support the status quo.
Passivity, however, would not be enough to create a more equitable
campus. O'Connell knew that, and used the idea of neutrality to
shield himself from criticism.
In 1968 Black students organized the Black Student Union
(BSU). Although Sam Taylor, the first black vice president of the
student body, led the effort, the university did not recognize the
BSU. The group asked for the establishment of a Black Culture
Center, a request they continued to pursue for the duration of
O'Connell's presidency. Liberal white students followed suit by
organizing the Union of Florida Students, who, together with the
BSU, demanded the recruitment of black students and faculty, as
well as a black dean. They also wanted to improve the working conditions and pay for black campus staff. O'Connell hired a coordinator for Disadvantaged Students and Minority Groups-a black
man named Roy Mitchell-who worked under Lester Hale.
Mitchell was meant to recruit black students and make them feel
welcome on campus. 55
During the late 1960s, student activism increased nationwide.
Students protested the Vietnam War and the draft, continued
racial inequality, heavy-handed administrations, and a sense of
alienation from the rightward-moving power structure. The black
power movement also turned the public's perception of the civil
54.
55.

O'Connell, interview, 146.
Ibid., 148.

https://stars.library.ucf.edu/fhq/vol89/iss3/5

18

Clawson: Administrative Recalcitrance and Government Intervention: Desegre

DESEGREGATION AT THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA

365

rights struggle away from nonviolent protest to a more militant
armed self-defense. 56 The University of Florida was no exception,
as students on campus increased their efforts to make their voices
heard to an administration that did not adequately address their
concerns. O'Connell disliked protests and found them unproductive, as they certainly were counter to his goals of running the university in accordance with his value of societal orderliness. The
activist students of all races, however, grew increasingly angry with
an administration that failed to heed to their voices, particularly
on the issue of racial integration on campus. 57
15 Apri11971

April 15, 1971 was not the day O'Connell or Hale expected.
O'Connell later recalled that the events of the day happened
"without any warning at all . It was orchestrated this way."58 Hale
had a confrontation with an angry student in the parking lot. He
then went to O'Connell's office in Tigert Hall to tell him the
activist students would not be satisfied until they had a conversation with O'Connell. While Hale did not know what they wanted,
he knew it was "a racial issue." According to Hale, O 'Connell
agreed to see a representative group. 59
O'Connell remembers things slightly differently. In his later
interview, he does not mention the conversation he had with Hale.
O'Connell's framing of the events has fifty or sixty black students
walking into his office without warning. Hale's version implies
O'Connell knew they were coming and agreed to speak with them
ahead of time . O'Connell also says he "later found out that the girl
who was on the telephone at the reception desk at the entrance to
the office had some alliance with them, too. She had been in conference with them."60 O'Connell's memory is of course constructed from his perspective on the events. He felt attacked by the
students. Even in later interviews he held that his position on the
issues was legitimate and theirs was built from a radical need to
prove a point about faster progress. Their activism, their demands
for increased enrollment, more black faculty, and acknowledge56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Anderson, The Movement and the Sixties, 166; and Link, William Friday, 128.
Boyd, "The Irony of Protest."
O'Connell, interview, 148.
Hale, interview, 55.
O'Connell , interview, 149.
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ment of the contributions of black culture through the creation of
a center, ran counter to his ideas about practical segregation. This
was the opposite of slow movement. University presidents have
structural, symbolic, and political power. 61 O'Connell's aim in
reconstructing this sit-in in his office was to de-legitimize both the
activists and their goals through wielding the power of his office.
The group came to O'Connell's office around ten o'clock that
morning and handed him a note from the BSU demanding he discuss hiring black faculty and funding the Black Culture Center.
They had tried to meet with him earlier, but he had been unreceptive . This time was much the same; he dismissed the students, saying he would not agree to their demands and that they must make
an appointment, at which time only a "reasonable number" of
black students could attend, before he would speak to them. They
came back twice that morning and were suspended the second
time when they refused to leave. The suspension could not have
been enforced because no effort was made to identify them. 62
About an hour later, the same group of roughly seventy staged
a sit-in in the outer office. O'Connell asked Roy Mitchell to help
remove the students, but he refused. When they refused to leave,
O'Connell had them arrested. 63 Mter they were forcibly removed
from Tigert Hall, he suggested to the judicial officer in charge of
setting the bonds for the arrested students that he release them on
their own recognizance. 64
Meanwhile, several hundred angry students, black and white,
converged on Tigert Hall to demand an audience with O'Connell
to discuss their classmates' arrests. O'Connell initially refused all
contact with the protesters, but he eventually agreed to speak with
the student body president. The students turned down this offer
and the campus security forces called for police backup. At that
point, the group said they would leave if O'Connell would speak to
their leaders. He did, denying their demand to remove the suspensions and drop charges against arrested students. He also refused

61.
62.
63.

64.

Adrianna Kezar et al. , "Creating a Web of Support: An Important Leadership
Strategy for Advancing Campus Diversity," Higher Education 55 (2008): 69-92.
O'Connell, interview, 151.
Stephen C. O'Connell, Press Conference Statement, 15 April 1971, Stephen
C. O 'Connell
Papers, University of Florida Library, Gainesville, FL. O'Connell
stated that sixty-six were students of the university and six were not
(O'Connell, interview, 152).
O'Connell, interview, 152.
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to approve the list of demands handed to him by the BSU earlier
in the day, but agreed to meet with a smaller number of black students to discuss their proposals. Many students moved behind the
administration building at this point and were confronted by
police; eight more students were arrested, and around $2000
worth of damage to university property took place. 65 Students of
many races felt the school had not taken the needs of minority students seriously. 66
The next day, it became clear that O'Connell had the support
of the establishment in the state and the university. The Florida
Board of Regents chairman issued a statement supporting
O'Connell and his actions. The Chairman, D. Burke Kibler, III,
called the methods used by the black students (avoiding implicating the several hundred white students involved) "improper and
illegal." He refused to recommend to the Board or to participate
in any action by the Board regarding an "artificial quota" being set
for black students, "to give them status not earned, no matter how
deprived or disadvantaged this group may be."67 Kibler was freer to
be outspoken than was O'Connell, who could draw an intensified
investigation by HEW in light of the previous day's events.
On the morning of April 16, O'Connell met with numerous
faculty members and administrators to apprise them of the events
and to seek their opinions. He also met with black faculty members
and with Roy Mitchell. He wanted to "establish effective communication links" to discuss and determine what had been and was
being done for black students, "why other things [could not] be
done" and to "encourage a responsible exchange of views on the
matter." 68 O'Connell sought to reestablish the legitimacy of his
conservative strategy. His actions make clear that he was not meeting with faculty and administrators to learn how to most quickly
and effectively increase black student enrollment, or where best to
locate funding for the Black Culture Center. He was acting to calm
people and make the "problem" go away. Rather than placing
value in increasing the diversity of the university to make it more
representative of the state it was built to serve, O'Connell empha-

65.
66.
67.
68.

Ibid., 152.
Hale, interview, 57.
D. Burke Kibler III, Statement, 16 April 1971 , Stephen C. O'Connell Papers
,
University of Florida Library, Gainesville, FL.
O'Connell, interview, 153.
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sized working within the established power structure. That power
structure was meant to preserve the privilege of the elite, not to
respond to student protest.
Activist students felt O'Connell had not done enough to establish links of communication or address the needs of black students.
Over the next four days, students held numerous rallies and
marches, but none resulted in violence or arrest. On April 19, the
BSU and Roy Mitchell, who claimed to be speaking for the entire
faculty, held a televised news conference in which they warned that
black students would withdraw and black faculty would resign from
the University of Florida if "full amnesty" was not granted to all seventy two students arrested on April 15. They also wanted an
"acceptable commitment to resolve all other proposals." 69
O'Connell could not regain traction with the students, if he had
ever had it. The students making demands of him would not be
convinced that a slow-moving integration process was an effective
one. It was not designed to be effective. It was meant to forestall
genuine integration for as long as possible.
Over the days and weeks after the events of April 15,
O'Connell claimed the students lacked restraint and judgment,
and he praised the school for having recognized the problems of
black students, faculty, and staff more in recent years than in the
university's history. The strategies of slow movement on racial
issues and token representation to avoid accusations of racism
were not lost on the students and faculty, who were not satisfied
with O'Connell's methods. 70 No matter how many students and
professors asked him to reconsider, he did not give ground .71 This
earned him the respect of many people across the state, including
69.
70.

71.

Ibid., 153.
Black students, faculty and staff wrote a letter to O'Connell ten days after the
incident. They pointed to a recent incident involving white fraternity members damaging university property with bulldozers who were not punished.
The letter writers asked that the punishments for the students involved be lifted, and that the university commit to trying to find a director, dean, or vice
president of Minority Affairs (Anonymous African Americans Students to
Stephen C. O'Connell 25 April 1971. Stephen C. O'Connell Papers,
University of Florida Library, Gainesville, FL).
The Arts and Sciences Faculty passed a resolution on April 21 to ask
O'Connell to drop the charges against the students and work to implement
their proposals, but he replied that he could not drop the charges and had
already been working on their proposals. See Arts and Sciences Faculty to
Stephen C. O'Connell, 21 April 1971 and Stephen C. O'Connell Letter to
CLAS Faculty, 24 April 1971, Stephen C. O 'Connell Papers
.
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some white students, who wrote letters praising him for not allowing the "negroes" or "communists" to take over. 72 O'Connell
served the anticommunist base of the conservative movement by
not heeding students who opposed the status quo . He was unwilling to allow disorderly student conduct to complicate the running
of the university.
On April 24, O'Connell and Mitchell met with the parents of the
arrested students. O 'Connell's purpose for the meeting was to "assure
them that the University, in accordance with its usual policy, had acted
reasonably to prevent permanent interruption of the students' educational opportunities, while at the same time insisting on observance by
the students of the University rules." 73 The group was interested not
only in the fate of the arrested students, but also in the school's plan
for providing for the welfare of black students going forward.
Mitchell's views of the events provide a contrast to
O'Connell's. Mitchell explained that O'Connell grew up in Florida
believing in segregation and had a change of heart as an adult,
although Mitchell was quick to point out that O'Connell still
belonged to the whites-only Gainesville Golf and Country Club.
Mitchell stated to the parents and others in attendance that it was
their obligation to work with O'Connell "only if' he would work
with them. He also said that the black students made reasonable,
minimal requests of their president, asking him to be fair. He
reminded the audience that O'Connell, when a judge, had concurred in the opinion in the Hawkins case.74 Mitchell felt calling
the police and declaring the area a riot zone had been unnecessarily provocative, partly because police held symbolic value in the
South after the violence of the civil rights movement. He advised
parents not to accept probation for their children, believing that
to do so would contribute to racial polarization. Rather, the state
of Florida, he fe lt, would benefit from such biracial cooperation as
had been displayed on Aprill5. 75
O'Connell later claimed that this meeting with parents was
unsuccessful because of Mitchell's "obstruction."76 Mitchell would
be accused of conspiring with the students and inciting the
demonstration, which he denied, insisting that the student action
72. O 'Connell, interview, 153.
73. Ibid. , 155.
74. Partial Transcript of Meeting, University of Florida, Gainesville , FL, 24 April
1971. Stephen C. O'Conn
er e ll Pap s.
75. Ibid .
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had been self-directed. 77 Hale and O'Connell had few qualms
about firing Mitchell after the Tigert demonstration. 78
In the midst of this, the BSU and others asked O'Connell to
withdraw his membership at the racially exclusive Gainesville Golf
and Country Club. He refused: "Those who demand that I, and
other University officials, cease to be members of the Gainesville
Golf and Country Club seem to argue that by our membership we
support as a matter of principle the segregation of the races. This is
neither a correct or a logical conclusion." O'Connell said he saw no
difference between his membership in the segregated golf club and
some students' participation with the BSU. 79 Cries of reverse racism
became a major component of the conservative movement in the
1970s. Those who used this rhetorical device adopted a firmly presentist mindset and overlooked the hundreds of years of oppression
and hegemony faced by black people. Participating in a group
formed by and limited to members of a group who have caused
oppression is a limiting of resources and a deliberate attempt to
exclude those found less worthy based on race. Participating in a
group formed by-but not always limited to- members of a group
who have historically suffered from oppression is a form of cultural
solidarity and is not about seeing oneself as superior to another.
The University Senate also spoke out against O'Connell and in
support of the BSU and appealed to the Gainesville city officials to
help make the community more attractive for the black students. 80
The BSU also wanted a department of minority affairs under the
direction of a vice president. However, O'Connell exhibited a sharp
example of his own beliefs when he said constructing such a depart76.
77.

O'Connell, interview, 161.
Hale claims to have hired Mitchell so he could help with "the transition of
absorbin g blacks" and advise the administration on providing programs for
black students. Then, Hale says, Mitchell "turned activist, and probably had
that intention when he was hired to begin with." Soon after he was hired,
Hale says, he was out "making speeches in high schools and stirring up
blacks." Hale regretted hiring anyone, given how Mitchell organized black
communities around the state against the university (Hale, interview, 54). See
also Partial Transcript of Meeting, University of Florida, 24 April 1971.
78. Hale, interview, 54; and O'Connell, interview, 161.
79. Stephen C. O'Connell, Country Club Membership Statement, Gainesville, FL,
12 May 1971, Stephen C. O'Connell Papers, University of Florida Library,
Gainesville, FL. The irony that O'Connell belonged to a segregated country
club but long refused to consider a Black Culture Center built on "racist or
group lines" was not lost on all observers.
80. University Senate Meeting, University of Florida, Gainesville, FL, 29 April1971,
Stephen C. O'Connell Papers, University of Florida Library, Gainesville, FL.
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ment would be to "build a structure on racist or group lines." He
also refused to establish a department of minority affairs on the
grounds that "it is obvious that such an office would interfere with
the normal processes of existing departments and colleges whose
task is to plan and execute educational programs for all students. It
would do irreparable damage to the operation of the colleges and
departments and cause conflicts that could not be lived with." 81 He
did not further elaborate what that irreparable damage might be,
given that universities are known for expansion and rearrangement.
Reitz, of course, had undertaken a very large project doing just that
not long before O'Connell became president. It was not the very
idea of change that O'Connell opposed. He did not want to disturb
the education for white students by diverting more resources to
minorities: the very basis of segregationist principles. He used his
power as a university president to stall the progress of desegregation
and racial equality at the state's largest university, without taking the
overt stance of someone like Alabama governor George Wallace,
who proclaimed, "Segregation now, segregation forever." O'Connell
instead employed the principles of practical segregation, but the students at the University of Florida opposed the tokenism and clear
racial inequality promoted by the university's administration.

Mtermath
The events of April 1971 brought HEW's attention to the
school. Additionally, seven United States Senators sought an investigation into the race relations at the school in June of 1971. 82
They urged the Civil Rights Commission to immediately investigate the situation fully. 83 HEW was concerned with the low black
81.
82.

83.

O'Connell, interview, 158.
The senators who asked for the investigation of the school included Birch
Bayh, George McGovern, John V. Tunney, Fred R. Harris, Walter F. Mondale,
Philip A. Hard, and Adlai E. Stevenson, III.
The United States Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare to Reverend
Theodore M. Hesburgh, Chairman, US Commission on Civil Rights, June 10,
1971, Stephen C. O'Connell Papers, University of Florida Library, Gainesville, FL.
O'Connell wrote a letter of his own to Hesburgh, objecting to the investigation
and criticizing the commission for relying solely on information supplied by Roy
Mitchell, who by this point had been fired. O'Connell complained that the
Commission never requested the details of the events of April 15, of the aftermath, or of "the sincere and successful efforts to enlarge the educational and
employment opportunities for blacks on our campus, efforts which we intend to
continue and improve." (Stephen C. O 'Connell to Theodore Hesburgh, 18June
1971, Stephen C O'Connell Papers, University of Florida Library, Gainesville, FO.
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student population. It followed up on its earlier investigation in
1972, and included the events of April 1971 in its conversation with
O'Connell. They found that the school had made such symbolic
gestures as creating a statement of equal educational opportunity
and included pictures of minority students in the literature it distributed. HEW advised O'Connell to make more funds available to
the Office of Minority Mfairs to provide for a stronger recruitment
program, which needed efforts beyond those HEW described as
"minimal." HEW also suggested the university establish an Advisory
Group to the President to prevent a recurrence of the April 15
activities.84
Quite a lot was done in the wake of April 15, 1971 in terms of
recruitment efforts and minority affairs. 85 By this time, Minority
Mfairs responsibilities were given to key black administrators in
the major divisions of the university. 86 Additionally, the office of
Student Mfairs established a budget specifically for the recruitment of minority students. 87 Various assistance programs were
implemented at the university. Project Upward Bound was a precollege program designed to help students from low-income backgrounds and underprivileged schools acquire the necessary skills
and motivation to survive a college environment. 88 The second
assistance program, the Expanded Educational Opportunities
Program (EEOP), was a compensatory program for low-income,
low-achieving students, and the main agent for helping black students gain admission to UF. 89 Finally, the Carnegie Program was
designed specifically in response to racial problems. It was meant

84.

85.
86.
87.
88.

89.

William R. Thomas, Regional Director of the Department of Health,
Education and Welfare to Stephen C. O'Connell, 28 January 1972, Stephen
C. O'Connell Papers, University of Florida Library, Gainesville, FL.
"Report on Minority Mfairs, March 1972," University of Florida, Gainesville,
FL, 1972, Lester Hale Papers, University of Florida Library, Gainesville, FL.
Lester Hale. "Student Mfairs Annual Report, July 1, 1971 -June 30, 1972,"
Lester Hale Papers.
Ibid.
Project Upward Bound began in June 1971. It was based on the assumption
that talented students may be restricted by some sort of deprivation. The language describing this program considers both class and race. It had nearly
$100,000 in funding, three-fourths of which was supplied by the federal government. As of the time the report was written, the program had forty minority students out of sixty total participants. "Report on Minority Mfairs, March
1972", 3-5.
The 1972 Minority Affairs report claimed that the EEOP made "tremendous
impact on the total educational program of the University of Florida." Ibid., 6.
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to help students from diverse backgrounds with a variety of needs
meet their educational goals. 90

Conclusion
The experiences of Reitz and O'Connell speak to the larger
roles of university presidents in furthering-or, in their cases, forestalling- diversity agendas at public institutions of higher education.91 At the University of Florida, President Reitz worked to build
consensus among various constituent pressures-students, community, and state-to integrate the university quietly, but did not
use this gathered force to further a diversity agenda. President
O'Connell appeared less interested in consensus and commitment
to diversity, preferring instead to forestall integration. University
presidents function within a political framework and with scarce
resources.92 Reitz and O'Connell favored the conservative agenda
of preserving the state university's resources for their traditional
recipients rather than integrating the campus and diversifying the
student body.
This attitude was not uncommon to those concerned with public schooling, and public universities specifically, during the times
of enforced desegregation. Rarely did desegregation of public universities happen without any violence or discomfort.9 3 Historians
of higher education have shown how students have assumed active
roles in the desegregation efforts of their universities. Robert Pratt
and Peter Wallenstien have taken the students' perspectives and
illustrated how they changed the school environment and forced a
reevaluation of segregationist positions. Their scholarship, along
with that of other historians of education in this area, also provides
a nuanced view of the civil rights movement and student involvement. Examining the role of university presidents permits a different perspective. It allows a view of the forces opposing student
90.
91.

92.
93.

Ibid ., 7.
Diversity issues, whether directly related to desegregation or raising an integrated university's profile as a place friendly to a variety of student backgrounds, are pressing and attention-drawing. They can harm an
otherwise-successful president's reputation, particularly, as Adrianna Kezar et
al. point out, when "attacks on campus affirmative action efforts bring offcampus politics onto the campus, compounding the difficulty of leading
diversity initiatives. " Kezar et al. , "Creating a Web of Support," 70.
Kezar et al., "Creating a Web of Support," 69-92.
Pratt, We Shall Not Be Moved; and Wallenstein, "Black Southerners at Non black
Universities," 43-44.
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demonstration and how the conservative rhetoric employed by this
opposition specifically applied to the university setting. Reitz and
O'Connell were not merely academic figures , they were politician~
in the state of Florida, with a vested interest in the status quo.
Their role in higher education history was one of recalcitrance and
forestalling, not of furthering democratic ideals.
Finally, the roles Reitz and O'Connell played in relation to the
desegregation of the University of Florida, as well as in postwar
conservatism, speak to the history of desegregation as a whole. In
particular, it extends the scholarship presented by William Link,
who focused on one university president, as well as Wallenstein
and Pratt, who concentrate on higher education desegregation
from the students ' perspectives and student activism. Presidents
and students played important roles in university desegregation
and both deserve examination. Reitz and O 'Connell were forces
not only against student activism but also against the desegregation
of the university and, hence, Gainesville. Their role as players in
state politics was not one of passive carriers-out of gubernatorial
decrees. They had daily roles to play in the process of desegregation and adopted practical desegregation strategies, as did the
politicians in Mississippi about whom Joseph Crespino wrote. 94
Historians of desegregation might look to southern university presidents to gain a better understanding of how these important and
powerful figures led state institutions through these chaotic and
confusing times. Whether they did so against the grain of the
state's conservative structure or in the service of it is indicative of
how postwar conservative rhetoric affected the university community and the larger ideas about desegregation.
94. Crespino, In Search of A nother Coun try, 19.
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